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 “Ship of Fools”:  




 In Book VI of Plato’s Republic, Socrates, illustrating a thought experiment, 
describes a mutiny aboard a ship. During the mutiny, every member of the crew begins to 
jockey for the position of captain, and each sailor makes his case despite his apparent 
unfitness for the job. Without true steerage, or any qualified captain for the job, the ship 
drifts aimlessly. The sailor who might actually be able to command the ship—one who is 
attentive to the wind, stars, and other minute details of navigation—is never considered. 
Instead, Socrates explains, his fellow shipmates regard him as “a real stargazer, a babbler, 
and a good-for-nothing” (Plato 162).  
 This analogy of the “ship of fools,” which functions as one of Plato’s more potent 
critiques of democracy, provides an interesting way into examining Herman Melville’s 
famously difficult 1857 novel The Confidence-Man, His Masquerade. Plato lends his 
focus to his “true captain,” intending his audience to consider the qualities he believed a 
leader should possess. Yet, in his novel—even invoking Plato’s “ship of fools” in 
Chapter Three—Melville takes the opposite tact. Rather than emphasize democracy’s 
failings by denouncing groupthink and the tyranny of the majority (as Plato does), 
Melville examines the philosophical viewpoints of democracy’s “fools” in order to better 
understand the drifting political institution they inhabit. In particular, Melville is 
interested in using the variety of religious and political opinions aboard his “ship of 
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fools” to investigate the role that religion plays in American democracy, here figured as a 
steamship travelling the Mississippi River (on April Fool’s Day) ironically named Fidele. 
Through this, Melville echoes the political philosophy of Alexis de Tocqueville, as he 
goes about dramatizing Tocqueville’s observation that “when authority in the matter of 
religion no longer exists, nor in the matter of politics, men are soon frightened at the 
aspect of this limitless independence” (418). Melville’s novel seems an extended proof of 
Tocqueville’s assertion that democracy and secularism are mutually exclusive ends, as 
Melville explores the implications of what occurs once we throw the philosophical baby 
out with the bathwater. 
 Perhaps in part due to its resistance of traditional genre conventions, scholarship 
on The Confidence-Man is wide-ranging and often contradictory (much like the novel 
itself). Lawrance Thompson, in his seminal 1952 critical work Melville’s Quarrel with 
God, asserts that Melville’s Confidence Man acts as a shape-shifting agent of a 
malevolent God, preaching Christian doctrine only for selfish gain (Thompson 297). On 
the contrary, more contemporary critic Jonathan Cook calls the novel a “satirical 
apocalypse” and seems to take a diametrically opposite view: “The Confidence-Man is a 
literary theodicy dramatizing the author’s obsession with the problem of evil, the 
existence of God, and man’s limited capacity to known God or comprehend the truths 
that would justify the ways of God to man” (Cook 10). The novel’s inconsistency of 
message, as well as the difficulty of sometimes perceiving Melville’s subtle irony, allows 
these two supposedly diametrically opposed readings to both contain a kernel of truth. 
Yet, if we consider the novel as making an overall political statement rather than a simply 
theological one, these critical differences are perhaps easier to square. While Melville is 
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certainly interested in questions of God’s justice and epistemological matters such as the 
availability of divine knowledge, The Confidence-Man—through its political and 
performative paradoxes—seems to also demonstrate how varieties of religious 
performance (and the ensuing uncertainty) serve to destabilize a democratic republic.1 
From the beginning of the novel, it is clear that Melville intends for his reader to 
consider the Fidele as a self-contained political institution. Of course, Melville uses the 
ship as a political microcosm elsewhere in his fiction. But, more than this, in the second 
chapter of The Confidence-Man, Melville specifically describes it as such: “the 
Fidele…might at distance have been taken by strangers for some whitewashed fort on a 
floating isle” (13). In this way, we see the Fidele as a contained political space (indeed a 
“fort”) that is forced to make sense of internal multiplicity and diversity. Yet even that 
diversity takes on a mythological and religious tint of pilgrimage: “As among Chaucer’s 
Canterbury pilgrims, or those oriental ones crossing the Red Sea towards Mecca in the 
festival month, there was no lack of variety…In short, a piebald parliament, an 
Anacharsis Cloots congress of all kinds of that multiform pilgrim species, man” (14). In 
the space I have elided from that quotation, Melville launches into a Whitmanian epic 
catalog describing the assorted masses contained on the boat. Like Whitman’s infamous 
Homeric catalogs in “Song of Myself,” this listing serves to create an inclusive and 
representative picture of American democracy. Like Whitman, Melville intends for his 
ship to reflect the religious and ethnic diversity of American society. For our purposes, 
the religious diversity of the ship’s makeup (featuring “Eastern philosophers,” “French 
Jews,” and “hard-shell Baptists” among others) is of special importance, as it 
demonstrates the depth of Melville’s investment in ensuring that his narrative’s religious 
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commentary is not solely limited to the Christian viewpoint of its most vocal characters. 
In addition, it is crucial that Melville—while taking pains to demonstrate the diversity of 
the ship’s participants—still refers to them as a political collective with revolutionary 
motive (“an Anacharis Cloots congress,” after a crucial figure in the French Revolution).  
 In addition to these political attributions, Melville also has invested the Fidele 
with religious purpose as a ship of “pilgrimage.” We saw this at first with his comparison 
to Chaucer’s “Canterbury pilgrims,” but there are additional resonances with his 
characterization of man as “that multiform pilgrim species.” When we consider the 
political configuration of the ship, which clearly represents a democratic entity winding 
through the heart of America, as well as the Chaucer allusion, it is perhaps inevitable that 
the Fidele never reaches its final destination of New Orleans. The novel instead ends 
open-endedly. Due to the resultant insinuations, it is still up for debate whether Melville 
intends the Fidele’s status as “pilgrimage” to be meant ironically, as Jonathan Cook 
certainly believes:  
Melville’s placing of the action [of the novel] on a ship of fools on April 
Fool’s Day is symptomatic of his religious predicament…[referencing St. 
Paul’s notion that “We are fools for Christ’s sake” from 1 Corinthians 
4:10]…being a fool of Christ could mean either becoming redemptively 
‘wise’ or else falling prey to a pious hoax created by an evil or amoral 
creator. (Cook 10) 
In this respect, Cook reads Melville’s pilgrimage rhetoric as yet another example of the 
characters being “conned.” This connects with Cook’s larger reading of the novel as a 
“satirical apocalypse,” wherein he views earnest religious belief as alongside numerous 
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other satirical targets (both historically specific and conceptually general). Melville’s 
religious skepticism is certainly on display in the novel, particularly in the way he figures 
belief as essentially requiring hypocrisy, however the role of religion in the novel (and in 
particular the political implications of this role) seems to be clearly much more complex 
than simple skepticism.  
 Rather than present a single monolithic religious authority, Melville presents a 
plurality of philosophical and religious stances, all of which are undercut by irony as they 
jockey for dominance of the novel’s world. Like the worlds of the Pequod in Moby-Dick 
and the Bellipotent in Billy Budd, the Fidele is a political blank slate waiting to be 
dominated by a monolithic ambition. Yet unlike those other ships—which are dominated 
by a monomaniacal desire for metaphysical justice and totalizing martial law 
(respectively)—the Fidele alternatively values any number of different philosophies, each 
revolving in and out of the narrative interchangeably. On this issue, Gary Lindberg 
remarks: 
Because the familiar bases of authority, class, and social position have 
been systematically uprooted in the culture Melville projects, each social 
gathering requires the creation of a credible authority…Social relations 
appear as games of confidence. If the breakdown of communal patterns 
frees the characters to create and assume their own identities, it also 
removes their security in identifying others or knowing how to relate to 
them. (Lindberg 24) 
This idea of “created” authorities, none of which privileged by Melville over others, 
provides the common impression of the novel as a “postmodern” text. Some of this 
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impression can certainly be traced to the Confidence Man character himself, who fades in 
an out of the novel in assorted guises (many of which will be addressed as this study 
proceeds). Yet, despite this unity of character working as a through-line between the 
novel’s many disparate dialogic scenes, Melville never allows any of the discussions to 
be concretely resolved or continued serially for any length across the novel. In these 
different dialogic scenes, the Confidence Man character takes various assorted (and 
sometimes contradictory) positions, shifting his convictions so that he might prove a 
more provocative interlocutor. This continuous dialogic structure then has the effect of 
knocking down each respective authority that emerges, replacing them instead with a 
deep distrust of social authority more generally. Through this technique, Melville appears 
to undercut the idea that there might be a totalizing social authority at all. Yet rather than 
asserting a postmodern resistance to narrative authority in all forms, Melville instead 
allows for individuals to (at times) express earnest and compelling viewpoints, even if he 
later demonstrates the hypocrisy of those positions.  
The first chapter of the book immediately sets up this competition of 
philosophical viewpoints, as it pits Christian charity against suspicious nihilism. The 
Deaf-Mute (the first iteration of The Confidence Man character), who acts as the catalyst 
for this initial action, provides a conceptual framework for understanding the actions that 
follow.2 At this start of the Fidele’s journey, the deaf-mute brings a chalkboard upon 
which he writes verses concerning the nature of “charity”: “Charity thinketh no evil”; 
“Charity suffereth long, and is kind”; “Charity endureth all things”; and “Charity never 
faileth” (Melville 8-9). These axioms are paraphrases of Paul’s famous description of 
“love” (translated in the King James Version as “charity”) from 1 Corinthians 13:4-8. 
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Melville casts the deaf-mute in opposite to the steamer’s barber, who writes “NO 
TRUST” on his corresponding chalkboard which—contrary to the “charity” verses—“did 
not, as it seemed, provoke any corresponding derision or surprise, much less indignation; 
and still less, to all appearances, did it gain for the inscriber the repute of being a 
simpleton” (Melville 10). From the start, the passengers on board the Fidele, by 
embracing the barber’s view and attacking the Deaf-Mute, seem to indicate that the 
prevailing attitude of the ship is “no trust” and—consequently—no truth. Hence, when 
the deaf-mute drifts to sleep at the end of the chapter, marking the slumber of pure 
Christian altruism in the text, Melville figures him almost as a sacrificial lamb: 
“Gradually overtaken by slumber, his flaxen head drooped, his whole lamb-like figure 
relaxed, and, half reclining against the ladder’s foot, lay motionless, as some sugar-snow 
in March, which, softly stealing down over night, with its white placidity startles the 
brown farmer peering out from his threshold at daybreak” (Melville 11). This 
impressionistic description seems meant to emphasize that the Deaf-Mute, unlike many 
of the other Christian caricatures throughout the novel, is portrayed earnestly and with a 
valuable message that is clearly lost on his fellow passengers. Further, we can perhaps 
even view the Deaf-Mute as a forerunner of Billy Budd, with the Deaf-Mute’s “lamb-like 
figure” and “white placidity” serving as markers for a type of archetypal innocence that 
Melville would employ with great effect in his last work of fiction.3 
In addition to his sacrificial and metaphorically charged slumber, the Deaf-Mute 
functions as a thematic prelude to the philosophical games that will soon follow. 
“Without his appearance at the beginning, the whole book would be different,” Tom 
Quirk writes. “Although he ‘cons’ no one out of anything, he is an apostle of charity who, 
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in contrast to the barber and his sign of No Trust, advocates faith, thereby setting the 
ironic stage that Melville’s antihero occupies while he preys upon these Christian virtues 
as well as upon the occasional hopes of his victims” (Quirk 69). The Deaf-Mute, perhaps 
because of his muteness, serves in a way as the ideal paragon of the novel’s Christian 
message. He also works to set the stakes of the book’s comment on democracy, 
demonstrating the people’s hostility to an outright message of faith when delivered 
without an external motive.  
Following the slumber of the innocent Deaf-Mute, the novel begins to interrogate 
in earnest the religious contradictions of its characters, notably considering a sober 
Methodist minister in Chapter Three. The minister attempts to advocate “charity” towards 
The Confidence Man (in the guise of the Black Guinea), who is being interrogated by a 
wooden-legged man. After a physical confrontation with the man, he gives a soliloquy 
about the importance of mutual trust in a society: “Let us profit by the lesson; and it is not 
this: that if, next to mistrusting Providence, there be aught that man should pray against, 
it is against mistrusting his fellow man” (Melville 22). Yet nearly immediately after this, 
the Methodist too eyes the Black Guinea with mistrust: “With an irresolute and troubled 
air, he mutely eyed the suppliant; against whom, somehow, by what seemed instinctive 
influences, the distrusts first set on foot were now generally reviving, and, if anything, 
with added severity” (Melville 23). The hypocrisy shown in this scene soon enough 
becomes a common occurrence and theme of the novel. Helen Trimpi, identifying the 
character as an allusion to Methodist preacher William Gannaway Brownlow, states 
Melville’s purpose with the character was to emphasize “the contradiction of the 
profession of Christian principle with the practice of a Christian minister” (Trimpi 69). 
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And so it goes with much of the novel’s Christian figures, as well as those professing 
almost any ideological system in the novel.  
This dissonance, between characters’ professed beliefs and their inability to put 
them into practice, cuts to the heart of Melville’s political intent in The Confidence-Man, 
particularly its assessment of the various religious truths and traditions the book 
represents. By uniformly demonstrating the difficulty of living up to one’s professed 
beliefs, Melville asserts a sort of democratic equality upon all religious belief. All 
believers are subject to hypocrisy at times; all belief is fundamentally inconsistent. 
Instead of genuine religious devotion and adherence to principles, we see the Methodist 
present a type of religious performance, mimicking the message and prestige of 
American religious devotion while never fully committing to the role. Throughout the 
novel, characters like these are left as enigmas: “we never learn whether characters are 
crooks or not, whether decisions to give or withhold trust are wise or foolish, ethical or 
wicked” (Lee 118). Indeed the novel seems obsessed with this type of moral ambiguity 
and the competing political fragments that result from it, especially when applied to 
notions of nation, self, or both. We can then think about every character throughout The 
Confidence-Man, and indeed The Confidence Man himself, as a cipher: an empty 
performance whose actual beliefs are subject to discussion. “All the characters on the 
Fidele wear costumes; none has a self” (Rogin 243). In this vein, Helen Trimpi asserts 
the inconsistency of the novel’s characters acts as a commentary upon the inability to 
maintain the political unity of “the states as a nation” (a message that would certainly 
resonate in 1857 as the nation hurdled towards the Civil War): 
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Against such unity [Melville] has set up a multiplicity of fragmenting 
political and philosophical agents—satirizing each and all of them as 
betrayers, for various reasons, of the national “faith” in political unity and 
in the founders’ “dream” of the trustworthiness of men to govern 
themselves. (Trimpi xiii) 
This returns, in part, to the ship’s attack upon the Christian Deaf-Mute from Chapter One. 
Without defined religious authority, and given the ambiguities of democracy’s political 
authority, the people are constantly in conflict with each other and with themselves. 
Indeed, the novel’s democratic conflict seems a proof of James Madison’s assertion in 
Federalist No. 51, “But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on 
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” In his insistence 
that government serve as a check on the impulse of man, Madison shows an 
acknowledgement of the same truth that Melville seems to intimate: that inconsistent 
mankind alone cannot be trusted to create functioning political democracy.  
Later in the novel, we see Melville furthering an even more explicit viewpoint on 
the role of religion in society, one that he again hedges by filtering it through the herb 
doctor (another of the Confidence Man’s guises). In Chapter Nineteen, the herb doctor 
responds to a pessimistic cripple who sarcastically calls his country “free Ameriky.” 
After chastising him for his lack of gratitude and patriotism, the herb doctor embarks 
upon another of the novel’s signature soliloquies: 
But it is never to be forgotten that human government, being subordinate 
to the divine, must needs, therefore, in its degree, partake of the 
characteristics of the divine. That is, while in general efficacious to 
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happiness, the world’s law may yet, in some cases, have, to the eye of 
reason, an unequal operation, just as, in the same imperfect view, some 
inequalities may appear in the operations of heaven’s law; nevertheless, to 
one who has a right confidence, final benignity is, in every instance, as 
sure with the one law as the other. (Melville 120) 
Once again, the herb doctor certainly has ulterior motives, and he later succeeds in 
getting the cripple to buy his medicine. Yet, as we must do with every speech in the 
novel, it is important to judge the value of his words apart from their utilitarian value in 
the confidence game. Indeed, the doctor here seems to echo the distrust Melville shows 
over the ability of individuals to have faith in the American project as well as to act 
rationally in their long-term best interests. The herb doctor’s final point—that, in essence, 
we are powerless to perceive the workings of law and thus must “have confidence” in the 
larger authority—seems a conciliatory rhetorical move not unlike that at the close of Job 
(a book Melville cites in the “Extracts” opening to Moby-Dick).4 In other words, the herb 
doctor advocates the long view of law’s efficacy, as he indicates that one must trust one’s 
institutions whether religious or secular.  
  One can also read the herb doctor’s speech as an argument for the long-term 
benefits of political freedom over the more immediate benefits of political equality. He 
seems to assert that the pursuit for immediate equality is itself a confidence game, trading 
the (far more valuable) benefits of long-term freedom for short-term fulfillment through 
equality. Tocqueville describes a similar viewpoint: “The goods that freedom brings 
show themselves only in the long term, and it is always easy to fail to recognize the cause 
that gives birth to them. The advantages of equality make themselves felt from now on, 
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and each day one sees them flow from their source” (Tocqueville 481). In this way, we 
can consider the herb doctor as an apologist for justice, not only in the cosmic, Joban 
sense but also in the literal, political sense. Hence, by advocating for confidence in these 
matters, the herb doctor actively ties religious faith (and the authority that it trusts in) to 
faith in an American democratic system and the freedom it is designed to enshrine. In this 
way, Melville seems to again tie the religious performance of the herb doctor (as he 
attempts to sell his medicines through appeals to Christian charity and American 
patriotism) to larger political questions surrounding equality and the ability of 
government to pursue it.  
 The introduction of the Cosmopolitan, the most stable iteration of the Confidence 
Man, makes this issue of performance even more pronounced. The Cosmopolitan’s 
presence overwhelms the second half of the novel, and his digressions and soliloquies 
provide the reader with some of the most vibrant and philosophically nuanced language 
in the book. Jonathan Cook emphasizes the change thus: “In broad terms, the most 
prominent difference between the Confidence Man in the first and second halves of the 
novel are those between a national and an international operator, and between the 
exploitation of the knave and the victimization of the fool” (68). Thus, we may perceive 
the Cosmopolitan’s message as perhaps less self-contradictory and less exploitative than 
previous iterations, especially in his honest and unabashed self-interest. In his 
introductory chapter, he famously characterizes life as a performance in the novel’s most 
quotable lines: “Sad business, this holding out against having a good time. Life is a pic-
nic en costume; one must take a part, assume a character, stand ready in a sensible way to 
play the fool” (Melville 161). This notion has countless formulations throughout history 
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and literature, from Shakespeare’s “All the world’s a stage…” soliloquy (which is 
actually alluded to in Chapter Forty-One) to the twentieth century sociological theories of 
Erving Goffman (in his 1959 book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life). Yet 
perhaps the most apparent use of such a characterization in this novel is that it helps mark 
the distinction between the public and private self, where one may hold and perform a 
public position while still participating in hypocrisy all the while—a crucial lens by 
which to interpret various characters’ religious stances.  
 By emphasizing the artificiality of performance (and asserting life as 
fundamentally part of a performance), the Cosmopolitan is able to indicate how logic and 
cause-and-effect reasoning break down on board the Fidele. In this formulation, 
democracy becomes a world of games, in which there will always be both winners and 
losers. Gary Lindberg views the Cosmopolitan character’s emphasis on performance to 
be key to comprehending the novel’s inner workings:   
Once we leave the conditional world of human encounters to predicate 
something absolute about one of the characters, we discover that logic 
fails…The many religious allusions in the novel may seem like hints at a 
subtext in which ambiguous appearances are clarified in fixed 
interpretations. But the very abundance of the allusions creates the effect 
of metaphysical punning, in which every appearance is, for allegorical 
purposes, multivalent…a reader cannot follow this novel by having a 
personal stake in the characters, an intellectual stake in the metaphysics, or 
a moral stake in the principles. We follow the immediate action of The 
Confidence-Man as we follow the moves in a game. (25-26) 
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This obviously has resonances in the idea of personal inconsistency (discussed earlier). 
However, Lindberg particularly identifies Melville’s refusal to ever fully enumerate a 
coherent ideology. Instead, the novel paints democratic society as a grand game of ideas, 
a performance of competing fools, wherein there will never truly be a winner. Melville 
seems to delight in the text’s inscrutability, as he distances his authorial voice and masks 
the true intentions of his characters. However, the multi-valence of meaning in the novel 
does not invite value judgments. The novel is not a one-to-one political or metaphysical 
allegory; there is no exact correspondence to reality for the many messages and conflicts 
it describes. Instead, Melville seems to dramatize the problem of existence within a 
political society that values both equality and religious difference simultaneously. As 
Tocqueville writes: “The greatest advantage of religions is to inspire wholly contrary 
instincts…Religious peoples are therefore naturally strong in precisely the spot where 
democratic peoples are weak” (419). Tocqueville sees religion as crucial for a democratic 
society because it inspires individuals out of self-interest. When there is widespread 
democratic and political equality, yet there is no check to ensure that individuals think 
also of the greater good, society runs the risk of becoming morally and philosophically 
unmoored. 
 In a demonstration of this unmooring, the Cosmopolitan refuses to admit that 
there is a difference between a truth and a lie. Instead, in Chapter 28, he insists that there 
is only faith or an absence of faith: 
I do not jumble [misanthropy and infidelity]; they are coordinates. For 
misanthropy, springing from the same root with disbelief of religion, is 
twin with that. It springs from the same root, I say; for, set aside 
	 15
materialism, and what is an atheist, but one who does not, or will not, see 
in the universe a ruling principle of love; and what a misanthrope, but one 
who does not, or will not, see in man a ruling principle of kindness? Don’t 
you see? In either case the vice consists in a want of confidence. (Melville 
188) 
This differential, which asserts that there are only those who believe and those who do 
not, seems an especially interesting comment to come from Melville, about whom 
Nathaniel Hawthorne famously declared “could neither believe nor be comfortable in his 
unbelief” (Delbanco 253). In this way, the Cosmopolitan asserts a false duality between 
confidence and lack thereof. There is—and, accounting for the multiplicity of democracy, 
must be—middle ground between confidence and lack of confidence. Contrary to what 
he says, the Cosmopolitan seems to instead illustrate that there is no middle ground in 
religious performance. When he claims, “one must take a part, assume a character, stand 
ready in a sensible way to play the fool,” the Cosmopolitan is demonstrating that 
performance only manifests in extremes (Melville 161). When performing an ideal of 
religious faith, there is no room for doubt.  
 In this light, it seems that many critical readings of the novel—which often assert 
that the novel furthers postmodern themes—are misguided. Andrew Delbanco, in his 
critical biography of Melville, summarizes this critical perspective well: “Melville’s book 
now seems a prophetically postmodern work in which swindler cannot be distinguished 
from swindled and the confidence man tells truth and lies simultaneously” (248). Yet it 
seems clear from this study so far that the confidence man does not tell truth and lies 
simultaneously, rather he tells them alternatively and for a particular motive. Further, it is 
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indeterminate the length to which the Confidence Man tells lies at all: “[the reader] does 
not have the privileged view of the past or of the future…that would bear out his or her 
suspicion that anybody in the novel is ever actually deceived” (Johnson 126). Thus, 
rather than making a postmodern point about the subjective nature of truth, as some 
critics assert, Melville instead seems to further a (typically Melvillian) point about the 
indeterminacy and inscrutability of any presented reality. This would again line up well 
with the understanding of these characters as all featuring indeterminate levels of 
confidence more generally, despite their performances of one extreme or another.  
 Indeed, Melville’s larger point is to indicate the ways to which totalizing 
philosophies (religious or secular) are unsatisfying in a democratic environment, as we 
see in Mark Winsome, Melville’s satire of Ralph Waldo Emerson (which begins in 
Chapter Thirty-Six). The primary point of contention between the Cosmopolitan and 
Winsome regards the basic goodness of humanity, particularly stated by one of 
Winsome’s opening greetings: “yours, sir, if I mistake not, must be a beautiful soul—one 
full of all love and truth; for where beauty is, there must those be” (Melville 224). The 
Cosmopolitan balks at this generous view of human nature, and their exchange goes on to 
consider general aspects of Transcendentalist thought as it relates to the possibility of 
“confidence.” Winsome, in his debates with the Cosmopolitan, is arguably a more overt 
confidence man than any of the titular figures throughout the novel. Unlike the various 
guises of the Confidence Man, who alternatively preaches truth and falsehood, 
Winsome’s philosophy is entirely incoherent: “for death, though in a worm, is majestic; 
while life, though in a king, is contemptible. So talk not against mummies. It is a part of 
my mission to teach mankind a due reverence for mummies” (Melville 230). Melville 
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renders Winsome as a purposefully haughty and disdainful thinker, unwilling to hear 
different points of view and full of “infantile intellectuality” (Melville 225). Unlike the 
Cosmopolitan, whose motives are (at the very least) discernable and stated, Winsome’s 
(and by extension Emerson’s) purposes are more opaque. Brian Yothers gives a helpful 
analysis of Melville’s critique: 
By the standards of, say, the sober Methodist minister [from Chapter 
Three], Winsome is clearly heretical, but he is at the same time deeply 
concerned with questions of morality, immortality, and the nature and 
destiny of humanity. Winsome presents an uncompromising argument for 
a way of viewing humanity that compliments human nature with a vision 
of its perfectibility, but also makes demands of human nature that seem 
wildly out of keeping with its frailties. (122) 
For Melville, who (throughout his entire career) is concerned with issues of man’s 
insignificance in the universe, Emerson’s philosophical “confidence”—in the ability of 
man to transcend a broken reality as well as the ability of humanity to forge an “original 
relation” to the universe—rings as false and misleading. Keeping in mind the 
Tocquevillian idea that religion should draw our focus away from our selves, Melville 
fears that transcendental ideas of the perfectible self have the contrary effect of drawing a 
democratic citizenry deeper into self-absorption. To counter these Emersonian ideas, 
Melville allows the Confidence Man to reflect their opposite: “Emerson postulates a 
being who can exist quite independent of social relations; Melville counters with an agent 
who exists only in the mutability of those relations” (Lindberg 43).  
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To further add to the critique, Melville endows Winsome with the same hypocrisy 
that effects all other inhabitants of The Confidence-Man’s world. In this instance, 
Melville draws directly upon the historical details of Emerson’s life to endow Winsome 
with Emerson’s own political biases, in this case against the southern beggar (thought to 
satirize Edgar Allan Poe). In so doing this, Melville not only satirizes two of his fellow 
nineteenth century literary giants, but he also gives vivid insight into the politics of an 
American democracy on the verge of civil war. Helen Trimpi evaluates this connection as 
such: “There is evidence in Emerson’s writings to show that he intensely disliked and 
distrusted not only Southerners like Poe who defended the slave system but Northern 
men who defended Southern rights under the Constitution, at the same time as he 
admired, liked and trusted Northern men of pronounced antislavery views” (Trimpi 205-
206). Through his evocation of Emerson’s bias, Melville once again makes a specific link 
between political stances and (quasi-) religious ones. And indeed, the link that he makes 
here (unlike the others earlier in the novel) is between a flawed philosophical stance and 
a confrontational political one. Other moments in the novel may be ambiguous as to 
whether they pass judgment on the views espoused; this is certainly not one of them. Yet, 
following the examinations of Winsome/Emerson (as well as his disciple Egbert, 
commonly read to satirize Henry David Thoreau), the novel takes a surprisingly 
meditative turn in its final reflections. 
The closing chapter of the novel, aptly titled “The Cosmopolitan Increases in 
Seriousness,” demonstrates Melville’s resistance to assert religious meaning on the book 
while also demonstrating his insistence on religion’s political value. The chapter features 
the discussion between the Cosmopolitan and an old man about the vagaries of religious 
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belief and, of course, confidence. Like the soliloquy of the herb doctor, both interlocutors 
assert the necessity of confidence in interlocking religious and political terms: the old 
man asserting religious confidence, the Cosmopolitan attempting to argue this should 
require worldly financial confidence. As many of these other dialogues do, the scene ends 
in uncertainty, as the audience is unsure whether or not the old man has been defrauded. 
Brian Yothers reads this scene, however, as key to the novel’s religious message: 
“Melville has brought us at the end of The Confidence-Man…to an agnostic stance in its 
strongest and richest sense…It is emphatically not a state of disengagement from the 
ultimate questions, but rather an especially bold and consistent probing of those 
questions” (125). Yothers is especially interested in a minor pun in the chapter: as the old 
man makes reference to the Bible as “apocrypha,” another man interrupts to ask “what’s 
that about the Apocalypse?” (Melville 287). Yothers remarks that this minor detail hits to 
the heart of the novel: “things hidden are conflated with things revealed, the word of God 
is conflated with the words of human beings, and a fundamental uncertainty about the 
status of religious knowledge is encapsulated in the pun of a sleepy and perhaps drunk 
passenger” (126). Through this scene, Yothers helpfully encapsulates the final notes of 
the novel as well as the ways in which we can attempt to make sense of the novel as a 
whole.  
The Confidence-Man, in its refusal to advance any concrete religious or political 
views, indeed acts as a fascinating text for considering the way in which Melville coopts 
his ideas concerning metaphysical inscrutability (as we see in works such as Moby-Dick) 
for more overt political and social motives. In critically addressing these ideas, Brian 
Yothers’s discussion of religious difference in the novel again perhaps is most applicable. 
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In particular, he emphasizes that Melville marks the separation between the private 
religious self and the public, social self, and he identifies this stance as prefiguring 
philosophical works such as Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (a theoretical influence for 
this study as well). Yothers explains the ways in which Melville both associates religious 
and political issues while also demonstrating the way in which they deviate from each 
other: “Time and time again in The Confidence-Man, characters affirm religious and 
philosophical identities that they have adopted, but the world in which they live and 
move is one in which the choice of whether or not to lend $100 to the person who 
requests it is one that transcends any sort of religious commitments” (Yothers 128). In 
this way, we can consider the personal inconsistencies of characters across the novel as 
demonstrating the way in which the modern world is disentangling two previously 
associated acts—charity and the monetary charitable giving that so often accompanied it. 
Further, Melville seems to probe the philosophical foundations of this disentanglement in 
an attempt to demonstrate the extent to which American political structures have always 
inevitably headed for this crossroads.  
The Confidence-Man, as one of Melville’s simultaneously least-popular and most-
difficult works, resists meaning and easy categorization for a reason. And while it is 
perhaps a cliché in this day and age to indicate that Melville’s work is “before its time,” 
this characterization seems perhaps more true in regards to this work, the final novel 
Melville published in his lifetime. Rather than engage in a critique of democracy (such as 
the one advanced by ancient writers like Plato), where political actors’ self-interest and 
performativity might undermine political unity, Melville stubbornly continues to 
advocate for democracy, despite its contradictions. In this way, The Confidence-Man 
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remains a startling testament to both the importance of democracy as well as the 
difficulty of maintaining it—issues that have only grown in importance since Melville’s 
time. Today, we can recognize the performances of the Confidence Man not only in TV 
commercials and political advertisements, but we see him in our neighbors and even in 
ourselves. In an increasingly commoditized world in a secular age, it seems more and 
more evident that, to make sense of our democratic society and our own roles in that 
society, we must take moral account of our personal inconsistencies as well as our own 
religious performances. Through this demand upon the reader, Melville’s feat in this 
novel—demanding introspection and serious thought from a book that seems to mock 
those same values—is a singular accomplishment, and it boldly makes its own place 
among both his already impressive oeuvre and the annals of American literature.  
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Notes 
1. Significant scholarship has also been done—most notably by critics such as Helen 
Trimpi and Michael Rogin—to pursue Melville’s specific allusions and historical 
references in the text of the novel. This is interesting and important work that I hope to 
draw on, though it will not be my main focus. This study will instead proceed with a 
more theoretical and philosophical reading of Melville’s religious politics in The 
Confidence-Man.  
2. Critical consensus reads the Confidence Man as a shape-shifting character who 
inhabits many roles over the course of the novel, and this reading will be assumed here. 
However, it is worth noting, there is a small minority of scholarship that dissents from 
this view. 
3. The appearance of “whiteness” in any Melville text certainly must draw comparisons 
to Chapter 42 of Moby-Dick, “The Whiteness of the Whale.” Thinking of the Deaf-Mute 
in this light, with whiteness signifying atheistic absence, perhaps renders the character 
more in line with Cook’s notion of the Confidence Man as oscillating between alternate 
roles of both devil and angel.  
4. See Job 38:4, “Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?” (KJV). 
God’s proof of his justice is an argument from power, that Job cannot understand God’s 
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